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Abstract: The product mix changes that have occurred in banking organizations during the 1990s provide a 
natural experiment for investigating how firms adjust their executive compensation contracts as their mix 
of businesses changes. Deregulation and new technology have eroded banking organizations’ comparative 
advantages and have made it easier for nonbank competitors to enter banking organizations’ lending and 
deposit-taking businesses. In response, banking organizations have shifted their sale mix toward 
noninterest income by engaging in municipal revenue bond underwriting, commercial paper underwriting, 
discount brokering, managing and advising open- and close-ended mutual funds, underwriting mortgage-
backed securities, selling and underwriting various forms of insurance products, selling annuities, and 
other investment banking activities via Section 20 subsidiaries. These mix changes could affect firms’ risk 
and the structure of CEO compensation. The authors find that as the average banking organization tilts its 
product mix toward fee-based activities and away from traditional activities, equity-based compensation 
increases. They also find that more risky banks have significantly higher levels of equity-based 
compensation, as do banks with more investment opportunities. But, more levered banks do not have 
higher levels of equity-based CEO compensation. Finally, the authors observe that equity-based 
compensation is more important after the Riegle-Neal Act of 1994. 
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1. Introduction 
 
During the 1980s and 1990s, banking organizations role as the main providers of credit has 
diminished (see Boyd and Gertler, 1994; Kaufman and Mote, 1994; Berger, Kashyap, and Scalise, 1995, 
Edwards and Mishkin, 1995; and Brewer, Minton, and Moser, 2000).  Brewer, Minton, and Moser report 
that from year-end 1974 to year-end 1992, the proportion of business loans in bank portfolios decreased 
from 21 percent to 16 percent of total bank assets.  Concurrently, banks’ share of short-term business 
credit has declined substantially from 79 percent to 54 percent.  Banking organizations have reacted to 
declining shares of credit by increasing the production and sale of fee-based financial services. Banking 
organizations have long earned noninterest income by offering “traditional” banking services such as 
checking, trust, and cash management.  But the expansion into municipal revenue bond underwriting, 
commercial paper underwriting, discount brokerage, managing and advising open- and close-end mutual 
funds, underwriting mortgage-backed securities, selling and underwriting various forms of insurance 
products, selling annuities, and other investment banking activities via Section 20 subsidiaries has given 
banking organizations opportunities to earn noninterest income from “nontraditional” services.  At the 
same time that banking organizations have expanded into fee-based financial activities, their use of 
equity-based compensation (i.e., stock options and restricted stock) to motivate executives has increased.  
The opportunity to produce and sell an expanded menu of fee-based financial services has 
afforded banking organizations a greater degree of managerial discretion and incentive to use equity-
based compensation. Smith and Watts (1992) argue that the degree of managerial discretion is inversely 
related to the degree of regulation. Product expansion increases the CEO’s investment opportunity set and 
could make it difficult for shareholders to evaluate the executive’s actions, thus exaggerating the 
information asymmetry problems between executives and shareholders. This point is underscored by the 
following quotation from a Standard & Poors’ analyst regarding J.P. Morgan & Co.: “Over the last 
decade, the company’s business mix has evolved, so that it has become increasingly reliant 
on…underwriting, advisory services, and trading.  This profile has rendered earnings more volatile.  The 2 
expense base has also become quite high, so that earnings could be vulnerable to revenue declines” 
(American Banker, January 26, 1998). 
In such an atmosphere of greater degree of uncertainty, there is no assurance that the self-
interested behavior of CEOs will conform to that expected by shareholders. Equity-based compensation 
contracts that give the executive a share in the outcome of his actions could encourage executives to 
expend efforts to take actions that are expected by shareholders (Prendergast, 2002). To some extent the 
incentive to use equity-based compensation contracts increased in the 1990s with the relaxation of federal 
restrictions on banking organizations’ activities. 
Cornett, Ors, and Tehranian (2002) find that the accounting- and market-based performance of 
banking organizations that established investment banking (Section 20) subsidiaries  increased 
significantly more than banking organizations that did not have investment banking subsidiaries.
1 Thus, it 
appears that the alliances between commercial banking and investment banking as a result of Section 20 
authorization have resulted in significant positive performance changes. It is possible that these changes 
could have altered the structure of CEO pay.  Fields and Fraser (1999) provides evidence on whether 
banking organizations that have Section 20 subsidiaries have pay-performance compensation schemes 
that are like those used by investment banks. They find that pay-performance sensitivities for those banks 
once they b egin securities underwriting are very similar to the sensitivities of non-Section 20 
organizations.   
In this article, we examine the relationship between the structure of CEO compensation and 
banking organizations’ financial characteristics from 1992 to 2000.  In particular, we ask three questions: 
First, does equity-based compensation as a fraction of total compensation increase or decrease with risk, 
leverage, and growth opportunities? Second, does equity-based compensation as a fraction of total 
compensation increase with noninterest income of bank holding companies? And, third, does equity-
                                                                 
1 Section 20 refers to the sections of the Banking Act of 1933 (i.e., the Glass-Steagall Act) that restrict affiliation of 
banks and securities firms. Prior to the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, Section 20 affiliates were the 
vehicle used by banking organizations to engage in investment banking activities. Financial Services Modernization 3 
based compensation as a fraction of total CEO compensation increase in the post-Reigle-Neal 
deregulatory environment? We find that as the average banking organization tilts its product mix toward 
fee-based activities and away from traditional activities, equity-based compensation increases. We also 
find that more risky banks have significantly higher levels of equity-based compensation, as do banks 
with more investment opportunities.  But, more levered banks do not have higher levels of equity-based 
CEO compensation. Finally, we observe that equity-based compensation is more important after the 
Riegle-Neal Act of 1994. 
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides some background on 
executive compensation.  Section 3 presents our set of hypotheses and discusses the theoretical (and 
empirical) executive compensation literature that informs our hypotheses.  Section 4 describes the data 
and methodology.  Our empirical results are reported in section 5.  And, section 6 summarizes the 
findings and offers conclusions.  
2. Background 
Chief executive officer (CEO) compensation has recently come under increased public and 
congressional scrutiny.  The use of equity-based compensation (i.e., stock options and restricted stock) to 
motivate executives has been a major focus of this debate.  The resulting concerns have led to demands 
for greater transparency in executive stock option programs and, possibly, to elimination of the programs 
altogether. Those calling for the elimination of stock options claim that they are a poor way to measure an 
executive’s contribution to firm performance.  This claim, however, is inconsistent with the empirical 
research literature on executive compensation. Murphy (1985) and Jensen and Murphy (1990) find a 
positive and statistically significant relationship between the level of pay and performance.
2  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Act of 1999 allows banks, securities firms, and insurance companies to be owned by the same holding company 
without the limitation imposed by Section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act. 
2 While they find a positive and statistically significant relationship between the pay of top-level executives and firm 
performance, Jensen and Murply (1990) indicate that the sensitivity of pay per dollar change in shareholder wealth 
is small for an occupation in which incentive pay is expected to play an important role. The pay-performance 
sensitivity for CEOs varies by size of the firm.  For CEOs in firms in the top half of their sample (ranked by market 
value), the pay-performance sensitivity is $1.85 per $1,000 change in shareholder wealth, while for CEOs in firms in 
the bottom half of their sample, the pay-performance sensitivity is $8.05 per $1,000. 4 
Equity-based compensation contracts that give the executive a share in the outcome of her actions 
could encourage executives to expend efforts to take actions that are expected by shareholders 
(Prendergast, 2002). To some extent the incentive to use equity-based compensation contracts increased 
in the 1990s with the relaxation of restrictions on banks’ activities.  
As a result of a variety of court challenges in the 1970s and 1980s, banking organizations by 1990 
were significant participants in  municipal revenue bond underwriting, commercial paper underwriting, 
discount brokerage, managing and advising open- and close-end mutual funds, underwriting mortgage-
backed securities, selling and underwriting various forms of insurance products, and selling annuities. 
Beginning in 1987, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System began to permit banking 
organizations to form separately capitalized security subsidiaries to underwrite corporate debt and equity 
securities under the Section 20 provisions of the Banking Act of 1933 (i.e., the Glass-Steagall Act).  
However, these subsidiaries’ revenue could not amount to more than 5 percent (increased later to 10 
percent and then 25 percent) of the total revenue generated by the banking organization. The Financial 
Services Modernization Act of 1999 (Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act), extends this authority and allows banks, 
securities firms, and  insurance companies to be owned by the same holding company. Product 
deregulation expands the investment opportunities for banking organizations. Concerns about the 
relationship between risk and performance produced Glass-Steagall. If these concerns are valid when 
commercial banking organizations have both banking and underwriting subsidiaries, we expect to see 
changes in performance and compensation that is tied to this performance.  For example, Cornett, Ors, 
and Tehranian (2002) find that the accounting- and market-based performance of banking organizations 
that established Section 20 subsidiaries increased significantly more than banking organizations that did 
not have Section 20 subsidiaries. Thus, it appears that the initial alliances between commercial banking 
and investment banking have resulted in significant positive performance changes, and these changes 
could alter the optimal structure of CEO pay.  Fields and Fraser (1999) provides evidence whether 
banking organizations that have Section 20 subsidiaries have pay-performance compensation schemes 
that are like those used by investment banks. They find that pay-performance sensitivities for those banks 5 
once they begin securities underwriting are very similar to the sensitivities of non-Section 20 
organizations.   
The expansion of banking organizations’ activities into investment banking and insurance 
presents opportunities to earn fee income from underwriting corporate debt and equity securities, selling 
and underwriting insurance products, as well as from originating and servicing loans separate from 
interest income earned by holding loans on the books.  
The conventional wisdom among bankers, bank regulators, and bank analysts is that this growth 
in fee-based income has allowed banking organizations to diversify their income stream because fee-
based earnings co-vary imperfectly with earnings from traditional banking products.  Thus, combining 
banking activities with nonbanking activities such as securities, insurance, and real estate will reduce the 
riskiness of banking organizations.  Academic studies tend to product mixed results on the diversification 
effects of combining traditional banking and non-traditional banking activities.
3 
DeYoung and Roland (2001) find that commercial bank earnings grow more volatile as banks tilt 
their product mixes away from traditional intermediation activities and toward fee-based activities.  They 
also find that the level of bank earnings increases as banks expand into fee-based activities.  This suggests 
that there is a risk premium associated with these activities.  Prendergast (2002) argues that increases in 
risk (or uncertainty) have could lead to a positive correlation between incentive compensation and risk.  
Prendergast (2002) suggests that uncertain environments result in relatively more delegation of 
responsibilities, and that this delegation of responsibilities in turn generates an environment in which 
incentive compensation is based relatively more on outputs.  Thus, risk and incentive compensation are 
positively related. 
Houston and James (1995) report no significant relationship between risk and incentive 
compensation.  However, their data is from the 1980s.  And, the banking industry today is far different 
from that of the 1980s. 
                                                                 
3 See Brewer, Fortier, and Pavel (1988) for a review of some of this literature.   
 6 
DeYoung and Roland (2001) provide three observations on why fee-based income may lead to 
more risky earning stream than income from traditional banking activities.  First, banks can have 
qualitatively different relationships with fee-based customers than with their traditional interest-based 
customers.  Revenue from a banking organization’s traditional lending activities may actually be 
relatively stable over time, because switching costs and information costs make it costly for either 
borrowers or lenders to walk away from a lending relationship.  In contrast, revenue from some fee-based 
activities may fluctuate more than interest-based activities, because banking organizations face high 
competitive rivalry, low information costs, and less stable demand in a number of these product markets 
(e.g., investment advice, mutual fund and insurance sales, data processing services).  For example, fee-
based income in the banking industry from mutual fund sales fell by about 50% in 1994, and commercial 
banking organizations’ trading revenues fell by 39% during the second quarter of 1999.  These short-run 
fluctuations in revenue would be unthinkable in the lending business where, even during an economic 
downturn, only a small percentage of loans stop making interest payments. 
Second, banks use substantially different mixes of inputs to produce fee-based financial services 
and intermediation-based products.  Once a bank has established a lending relationship, increasing the 
amount of credit actually extended to that customer requires the banking organization to increase only its 
variable costs (e.g., interest expense).  In contrast, expanding the production of certain fee-based services 
can require the banking organization to hire additional fixed labor inputs, which can increase the 
organization’s operating leverage.  The key here is a high ratio of fixed-to-variable expenses (that is, high 
operating leverage) turns any given amount of revenue volatility into an even greater amount of earnings 
volatility.   
Third, bank regulators do not require banking organizations to hold as much capital against fee-
based activities as interest-based activities (see Spong, 1994, page 76), and banking organizations that 
take advantage of this can increase their returns to equity.  For example, a Dean Witter Reynolds analyst 
concluded that Mellon Bank Corp. redeemed $160 million of its preferred stock in the aftermath of 
purchasing securities giant Dreyfus Corp. because the combined firms “…don’t need as much capital for 7 
their fee-based business as they have for the spread business” (American Banker, December 21, 1994).  
Although most banking organizations will internally allocate some capital to these activities, the relative 
low level of capital relative to traditional interest-based activities suggests a higher degree of financial 
leverage—and thus higher earning volatility—for these lines of business, according to DeYoung and 
Roland (2001). 
Despite the extensive research devoted to chief executive officers’ pay and performance, there are 
only a few studies addressing these issues in the banking industry.  Banking is an industry in which 
regulation plays a major role, so moves to relax these regulations may have a significant impact on the 
relationship between CEO pay and performance.  For example, Crawford, Ezzell, and Miles (1995) and 
Hubbard and Palia (1995) find that bank CEOs’ pay-performance sensitivity has increased significantly 
due to deregulation in the banking industry.  Furthermore, Houston and James (1995) compare bank 
CEOs pay-performance with non-bank CEOs’ pay-performance.  They find that bank CEOs have lower 
pay-performance sensitivity than non-bank CEOs.  Barro and Barro (1990) find that bank CEOs’ pay-
performance sensitivity diminishes with CEOs experience.  All of these studies, however, use data from 
periods well before the deregulatory events considered in this study. This study adds to the growing 
literature on bank CEO compensation by testing whether fee-based financial service products are 
designed to promote greater risk-taking among banking organizations or whether they are designed to 
promote more stable earnings and less risk-taking than other products.  
3. Testable hypotheses 
The theoretical literature suggests that the structure of CEO compensation should be a function of 
the firm risk, leverage, size, and growth opportunities (John and John, 1993; Aggarwal and Samwick, 
1999; John, Saunders, and Senbet, 2000; Hermalin and Wallace, 2001; Prendergast, 2002).  It is well 
known that because shareholders hold residual claims on earnings, their interests will often diverge from 
those of creditors of the firm.  Shareholders will have incentives to purchase some projects with negative 
net present values if the increase in the shareholders' option value from accepting these projects is 
sufficient enlarged.  This is because shareholders keep all the gains if the investments are winners, and 8 
they share the losses with creditors if the investments are losers.  Because of this option-like payoff for 
shareholders, especially of highly levered firms, a CEO compensation structure that is relatively more 
equity-based may better serve to align the interest of the CEO with that of the firm’s shareholders. 
While shareholders have incentives to increase risk and leverage, there are offsetting costs that 
weigh against these incentives. Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that CEOs receive private benefits 
from control of the firm.  Because a CEO has an undiversifiable stake in the firm that employs her human 
capital, she has an incentive to reduce risk in order to protect this stake (Jin, 2002).  In addition, the firm’s 
creditors (depositors) will require compensation for bearing increased risk and higher leverage in the form 
of a higher return on their funds, or restrict the amount of their investment, or both.  Thus, the willingness 
of CEOs to invest in negative net present value (NPV) projects is held in check by their desire to protect 
their undiversified stake in the firm and the concern of creditors for the safety of their funds. This 
suggests that a CEO compensation structure that is relatively less equity-based can serve as a commitment 
device to hold in check the willingness of CEO to invest in negative NPV projects (John and Qian, 2003).  
This suggests that the creditors of firms with relatively low capital levels will tend to prefer CEO 
compensation structures that are relatively less equity-based. 
However, if the creditors operate under the protection of a federal deposit insurance system, then 
one element of this restraint will be negated.  Since depositors' funds are insured, depositors do not have 
any incentive to impose discipline on the use of their funds.  The deposit insurer, as the guarantor of 
deposits, serves the role of creditor to the banking organization.  So long as a greater premium is not 
charged for bearing risk, or covenants are not imposed to prevent excessive risk-taking, banking 
organizations will use deposits to engage in riskier activities than would otherwise be possible.  Merton 
(1977) develops a  framework for analyzing the cost of deposit insurance and evaluating the deposit 
insurer's liability.  Buser, Chen, and Kane (1981) indicates that providing deposit insurance at less than its 
market value provides federally insured depository institutions with a subsidy.  The subsidy is equal to the 
difference between the cost of deposits in the absence of deposit insurance and the cost of insured 
deposits including the deposit insurance assessment.   9 
Many researchers, including Merton (1978), Kane (1985), and Brickley and James (1986), have 
indicated that a federally insured depository institution has, in addition to the tangible assets on the 
balance sheet, a valuable "intangible" asset in the form of access to underpriced, fixed-premium deposit 
insurance.  The capitalized value of the subsidy is imbedded in the firm's common stock price.  As long as 
the premium charged for insurance is less than the amount needed to compensate the deposit insurer for 
the exposure to risk, then expansion into riskier activities may enhance a banking organization common 
stock returns because risk-taking is subsidized.  This behavior is referred to as the Moral Hazard 
hypothesis in Houston and James (1995) and the FDIC hypothesis in Crawford, Ezzell, and Miles (1995). 
The Moral Hazard/FDIC hypothesis predicts that CEOs of banking organizations with higher risk will 
receive a higher proportion of their overall compensation in the form of equity-based pay.  This is because 
increased risk increases the value of the executive’s equity position.  On the other hand, this hypothesis 
predicts that executives of banking organizations with low risk will have a higher proportion of overall 
compensation in the form of cash-based pay. This is because such executives are like fixed-claimants.  
Thus, increased risk will increase their exposure to financial distress without an offsetting increase in 
expected benefits. 
The effect of product deregulation on bank CEO’s compensation structure depends on which 
activities are permitted, which activities banking organizations invest in, how these activities mix with 
other assets, and how the activities are managed.  Allowing banking organizations to expand both 
geographically and into nontraditional financial products (e.g., investment banking activities) expands the 
efficient risk/return frontier available to firms. The expanded efficient risk/return frontier provides 
banking organizations’ CEOs with more growth opportunities.  Smith and Watts (1992) suggest that a 
CEO’s actions are less readily observable if the firm has more growth opportunities. It is probably 
reasonable to assume that a firm’s CEO knows more than shareholders and outside board members about 
the firm’s projects and prospects.  The greater is the investment opportunities that are available to CEOs 
the more difficult it will be to observe their investment choices.  In such an atmosphere of asymmetry, 
there is no assurance that the self-interest behavior of the CEO will conform to that expected by 10 
shareholders. To align the interest of the CEO with that of shareholders, the firm could tie managerial 
compensation to the effect of the CEO’s action on firm value. Equity-based compensation contracts 
giving CEOs a share of the outcome of their actions encourage them to explore newer investment 
opportunities to increase the possibility of large payoffs (Prendergast, 2002).  The conjecture that greater 
growth opportunities are correlated with relatively more equity-based compensation is referred to as the 
contracting hypothesis by Smith and Watts (1992).   
The above arguments give rise to the following five hypotheses: 
H1:  Equity-based compensation as a fraction of total compensation ( EBC) increases with 
performance. This hypothesis tests the contracting hypothesis of Smith and Watts (1992).  
Empirical studies relate compensation to performance because of the incentive effects of 
pay on managerial actions (e.g., Jensen and Murphy, 1990; and Mehran, 1995). 
H2:  EBC increases (or decreases) with financial leverage.  This provides a test of the Moral 
Hazard hypothesis.  Increases in financial leverage can lead to lower EBC because it may 
prevent managers from taking poor projects. 
H3:  EBC increases (decreases) with risk.  Like H2, this provides a test of the Moral Hazard 
Hypothesis.  Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) suggest that EBC for a risk-averse manager 
should be inversely correlated with firm risk. 
H4:  EBC is higher for banking organizations with relatively more noninterest income.  
In the next two sections, we develop a methodology and test these hypotheses. 
4.  Methodology and data 
A.  Methodology 
To develop a test of the above hypotheses regarding the impact of banking firm’s financial 
characteristics on EBC, we specify the following regression model, similar to Houston and James (1995): 11 
+ + + + = - - - 1 , 3 1 , 2 1 , 1 0 , t j t j t j t j RISK LEVERAGE E PERFORMANC EBC a a a a  
t j t j SIZE , 1 , 4 e a + -              (1) 
where  PERFORMANCE j,t-1 is a measure of a banking organization’s market- or accounting-based 
performance and is captured by two variables: the market value of equity divided by the book value of 
equity and net income divided by total assets; LEVERAGEj,t-1 is a measure of a banking organization’s 
leverage and is captured by two variables: one minus the book value of equity divided by the book value 
of total assets and total deposits divided by total assets; RISKj,t-1 is the variance of daily stock return 
within a year; SIZEj,t-1 is the value of total assets divided by 1000; and ej,t is an error term.
4 
In the above specification a positive a1 implies that EBC increases with growth opportunities; a 
positive a 2  that  EBC increases with financial leverage; a positive (negative) a 3  that  EBC increases 
(decreases) with risk; and a positive a4 that EBC increases with the size of the banking firm.  
Risk Hypothesis  
  Regulation in banking has traditionally focused on controlling risk-taking by  
imposing minimum capital requirements and by limiting banks’ asset and liability choices.  However, the 
FDIC Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA) expanded regulatory oversight and included the compensation 
policies toward senior management.  Houston and James (1995) suggest that FDICIA was in response to a 
direct recognition by regulators that compensation contracts in banking be structured to provide CEOs 
with excessive risk-taking incentives to exploit the provision of fixed-rate deposit insurance.  And John, 
Saunders, and Senbet (2000) develop a model in which executive compensation contracts serve to 
mitigate the moral hazard problem inherent in bank regulation.  Implicitly, they suggest that optimal bank 
executive compensation contracts may be a substitute for regulation. 
Nonetheless, the sign of the relationship between risk and incentive compensation as yet is still 
hotly debated in the literature.  For example, in most agency models, such as Aggarwal and Samwick 
                                                                 
4 Most previous work on executive compensation has generally used one of two functional forms to estimate the 
relationship between compensation and firm size (Murphy, 1998, has a discussion of the different approaches). The 
first approach is to regress the dollar value of compensation on the dollar value of firm size. The second approach is 12 
(1999), the outcome is a negative relationship between risk and incentive compensation.  However, 
Prendergast (2002) argues that risk (or uncertainty) has another impact on incentive compensation that 
may lead to a positive correlation between incentive compensation and risk.  Prendergast (2002) suggests 
that uncertain environments result in relatively more delegation of responsibilities, and that this 
delegation of responsibilities in turn generates an environment in which incentive compensation is based 
relatively more on outputs.  Thus, uncertainty and incentive pay are positively related. 
  In the only other empirical study of incentive based bank CEO compensation that includes a 
control variable for risk, Houston and James (1995) report no significant relationship between risk and 
incentive compensation.  However, their data is from the 1980s.  And, the banking industry today is far 
different from that of the 1980s. 
  Based on the conflicting theoretical evidence, we have no priors about the sign of our risk 
measure. 
The product deregulation hypothesis 
To investigate the impact of product deregulation on EBC, our specification includes a 
measure of the fee-based activities of banking organizations. We capture these activities by 
isolating traditional noninterest revenue and nontraditional noninterest revenue. Traditional 
noninterest revenue is income from fiduciary activities plus service charges on deposit accounts. 
Nontraditional sources of noninterest revenue are all other noninterest revenue (e.g., income 
from Section 20 activity).  
Permitting banking organizations to engage in  municipal revenue bond underwriting, 
commercial paper underwriting, discount brokerage, managing and advising open- and close-end mutual 
funds, underwriting mortgage-backed securities, selling annuities, and other investment banking expands 
their efficient risk/return frontier. The expanded efficient risk/return frontier provides banking 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
to regress the log of compensation on the log of size.  Murphy says that there is no theoretical reason to prefer one 
approach to the other. 13 
organizations’ CEOs with more growth opportunities.  Thus, one may interpret the coefficient on 
nontraditional noninterest revenue as capturing how past expansion into municipal revenue bond 
underwriting, commercial paper underwriting, discount brokerage, managing and advising open- and 
close-end mutual funds, underwriting mortgage-backed securities, selling annuities, and other investment 
banking activities are reflected in CEO compensation structure. 
To account for each of the above factors, an expanded model is used.  We write the expanded 
model as an equation (2): 
+ + + + + = - - - - 1 , 4 1 , 3 1 , 2 1 , 1 0 , t j t j t j t j t j SIZE RISK LEVERAGE E PERFORMANC EBC a a a a a  
  t j t t j t j t j DEREG SECT TRADNOINT NT NONTRADNOI , 8 1 , 7 1 , 6 1 , 5 20 e a a a a + + + + - - -   (2) 
 
NONTRADNOINTj,t-1 is nontraditional sources of noninterest revenue (e.g., income from Section 20 
activity); TRADNOINTj,t-1 is traditional sources of noninterest revenue (e.g., fees from deposit services); 
SECT20j,t-1 is a Section 20 binary variable that is equal to one for the banking organizations with Section 
20 subsidiaries, zero otherwise; and DEREGt is a Reigle-Neal binary variable that is equal to one after 
1996, zero otherwise.
5  The Section 20 binary variable captures  
the present of banking organizations with Section 20 subsidiaries.  This variable is likely correlated with 
firm size.  Thus, NONTRADNOINTj,t-1 provides a test of the importance of all forms of nontraditional 
sources of noninterest revenue on the structure of CEO compensation. 
                                                                 
5 We include the Riegle-Neal binary variable in the specification to control for the impact of changes in the 
competitive environment on CEO compensation structure. The Reigle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching 
Efficiency Act of 1994 allows banks to branch interstate by consolidating existing out-of-state bank subsidiaries or 
by acquiring banks or individual branches through mergers and acquisitions.Prior to the Reigle-Neal Act, federal 
and state laws prevented banks from expanding across state lines (with some exceptions). One exception was that a 
banking organization could conduct interstate banking operations through “nonbank banks”--those that do not meet 
the definition of a bank. Banks are commonly defined as institutions that both accept demand deposits and make 
commercial loans.  The Reigle-Neal Act allows bank holding companies to acquire banks in any state, effective 
September 29, 1995, and allows mergers between banks located in different states beginning June 1, 1997. Unless 
states individually opt out of this branching authority or choose to adopt an earlier starting date. The deregulation 
associated with the Riegle-Neal Act served to increase the trend of interstate acquisitions and statewide branch 
banking.  This created a more competitive environment by allowing banks to enter new markets and challenge 
incumbent banks.  Stiroh and Strahan (2003) document that this type of deregulation of banking markets allowed 
high performing banks to increase their market share at a much faster pace after the deregulation.  Thus, these 
competitive reallocation effects will transfer assets to better performers after deregulation, this could be reflect in the 
structure of CEO compensation. 14 
  The use of equity-based compensation increased during the sample period. To incorporate this 
dynamic effect, we estimated pooled cross-sectional time series regression equations.   
B.  Data 
        The data used in this paper are for 100 banking organizations whose compensation data was found in 
Standard & Poor's Compustat ExecuComp database.  These compensation data are based on each banks’ 
publicly filed proxy statements.  The data include measures of short-term compensation, such as base pay 
and annual bonus; and measures of long-term compensation, such as long-term incentive plans, restricted 
stock, and the value of options granted (using an approximation of the Black-Scholes option pricing 
method).  Accounting data used in this study was obtained from bank holding company (BHC) Y9 reports.  
The Center for Research in Security Prices (CSRP) database provides the stock market data.  Our sample 
contains 621 firm-year observations. Equity-based compensation is measured as the value of option grants 
plus the value of restricted stock grants divided by the sum of salary, bonus, the value of option grants, 
and the value of restricted stock grants. 
To obtain our measures of RISK, we use daily stock market data.  For each year in the sample 
period, estimates of the variance of each banking organization’s equity returns are made using data 
covering the twelve-month period ending with the last month of the year.  Financial leverage 
(LEVERAGE) is estimated as one minus the ratio of book market value of capital to total assets.  We also 
use the ratio of total deposits to total assets as a measure of financial leverage because several of the 
components in the first measure of leverage are included in the regulatory definition of total capital. 
PERFORMANCE is captured by two measures: the ratio of market to book value of the firm’s equity, 
and ROA, computed as the ratio of net income to total assets.  SIZE is total assets divided by 1000. Thus, 
the coefficient a4 captures how a million dollars change in total assets influences EBC.
6 TRADNOINT is 
income from fiduciary activities plus fees from deposit services divided by total revenue.  
NONTRADNOINT is all other noninterest income divided by total revenue. 
                                                                 
6 We also included an asset growth variable in the empirical specifications.  In none of the regression equations was 
this variable statistically significant.  Thus, we do not report those results. 15 
Table 1 provides a list of banking organizations authorized by the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System to engage in securities underwriting, the year such securities underwriting may 
be conducted through a Section 20 subsidiary, and the average asset over the sample period.  The average 
size ranges between $4 and $337 billion over the 1992-2000 period. 
CEOs are paid in many different ways.  For some CEOs, salary accounts for only a small part of 
their compensation.  Managers may also receive performance-related bonuses, restricted shares, and stock 
options.  We want to test the relationship between managerial compensation, deregulation and Section 20 
activity.  We also want to distinguish between cash- and equity-based compensation, since the incentives 
for a manager to increase firm value depend on whether pay is related to such value creation. Following 
others such as Hubbard and Palia (1995), we break compensation into two parts: cash-based (salary plus 
bonus) and equity-based (value of newly granted restricted shares granted and stock options).  
Table 2 shows that over the 1992-2000 period real average cash-based compensation ranges 
between $1.2 to $2 billion (reported in 1982-84 dollars) for banking organizations with Section 20 
subsidiaries and between $580,000 and $708,000 for other organizations. Cash-based compensation 
represents between 25% and 63% of total new compensation for banking organizations with Section 20 
subsidiaries and between 34% and 66% for  other organizations. Compensation varies widely across 
banking organizations and time, which is not surprising since most of our banking organizations grew 
significantly over the sample period.  Even after normalizing compensation for asset size, there is still a 
wide variation.  For banking organizations with Section 20 subsidiaries, total compensation ranges from 
$0.0564 to $0.1366 per thousand dollars of assets, while cash compensation ranges from $0.0353 to 
$0.0434 per thousand dollars of assets. For other banking organizations, total compensation ranges from 
$0.1284 to $0.2689 per thousand dollars of assets, while cash compensation ranges from $0.0848 to 
$0.1094 per thousand dollars of assets.   
Figure 1 presents additional information on how the compensation structure has changed over the 
1992 and 2000 sample period.  Equity-based compensation as percent of direct compensation is reported 
for both banking organizations with Section 20 subsidiaries and those without Section 20 subsidiaries. 16 
Three findings are worth noting. First, equity-based compensations as a percent of direct compensation 
(EBC) is increasing over the years:  in 1992,  EBC was 30%; that percentage was about 53% by 2000.  
Banking organizations with Section 20 subsidiaries tend to have on average higher EBC than other firms.  
In fact, over our sample period, average equity-based compensation as a percent of direct compensation 
was 49% for Section 20 banking organizations and 37% for non-Section 20 firms.  Third, in the period 
after 1994, it appears that EBC at non-Section 20 firms is increasing at a slightly faster rate than that at 
Section 20 banking organizations.  For example, EBC of Section 20 banking organizations average 55.72 
percent over the 1995-2000 period, about 15.15 percent more than over the 1992-1994 period; EBC of 
non-Section 20 banking organizations average 41.97 percent over the 1995-200 period, about 17.02 more 
than over the 1992-1994 period.  Thus, it appears that non-Section 20 firms are increasing the use of 
equity-based compensation at a faster rate than Section 20 firms. 
5.  Empirical results 
We estimate equation (2) to examine the correlation between equity-based compensation and 
characteristics of banking organizations.  Table 3 reports the summary statistics for the variables used in 
our regression specifications.  Table 4 presents the results of these pooled cross-sectional time series 
regression using annual data from 1992 to 2000.  Regression (1) of table 4 uses the market-to-book value 
ratio as the performance measure and the ratio of total deposit to total asset as the leverage measure to 
examine the correlates between equity-based compensation and the firm’s financial characteristics 
(excluding firm size). Regression (2) of table 4 includes firm size in the specification reported in (1).   
The results in columns (1) and (2) are consistent with the results of prior research.  Like Houston 
and James (1995), we find that EBC is significantly and positively correlated to the market-to-book value 
ratio. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that banking organizations with greater investment 
opportunities are more likely to rely on equity-based incentives.  We also find a negative but insignificant 
correlation between leverage and EBC.  The positive coefficient on the risk variable (measured by the 
variance of stock returns) suggests that equity-based incentives increase with the level of risk taking. The 
Section 20 binary variable is positive and statistically significant in column (1) regression, suggesting that 17 
banking organizations’ with Section 20 subsidiaries, on average, have higher EBC. But when size is 
included (Regression (2)), the Section 20 binary variable is not significant at conventional levels.  EBC is 
positively and significantly correlated with a banking organization’s size.  
Column (3) reports the results using the ratio of total deposits to total asset as the leverage 
measure.  Like the variable one minus the ratio of book market value of capital to total assets, this ratio is 
not significantly correlated with EBC.  
Column (4) reports the results using return on assets as the performance measure and   the 
variable one minus the ratio of book market value of capital to total assets as the leverage variable. Return 
on assets is positively correlated with EBC, but it is insignificant at the conventional levels.  The leverage 
measure is also insignificant at the conventional levels. Column (5) uses the ratio of total deposits to total 
asset as the leverage measure. Again, this variable is not significantly correlated with EBC. 
Overall, the Reigle-Neal indicator variable is positive, consistent with the increased use of equity-
based incentives after the passage of Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act in 1994.  This is 
consistent with the findings of Kole and Lehn (1999) who study the impact of deregulation on the airline 
industry.  
The variable capturing product mix changes, nontraditional noninterest revenue divided by total 
revenue, is positive and statistically significantly correlated with EBC, suggesting that CEOs of banking 
organizations with higher than average nontraditional noninterest revenue (e.g., from activities of Section 
20 subsidiaries as well as other nontraditional activities), on average, have significantly more equity-
based compensation.  Cornett, Ors, and Tehranian (2002) find that a banking organization’s performance 
following the establishment of Section 20 subsidiaries improved relative to a control group of banking 
organizations that did not establish Section 20 subsidiaries.  As indicated in figure 2, banking 
organization with Section 20 subsidiaries tend to have relatively more revenue from nontraditional 
noninterest sources.  Since Section 20 activities generate nontraditional noninterest revenue, our results 
are consistent with the conjecture that CEOs of Section 20 banking organizations captured some of these 
gains in the form of higher equity-based compensation relative to CEOs of non-Section 20 firms. 18 
6. Conclusion 
One of the fundamental components of corporate governance is a well-designed CEO 
compensation package.  However, very little attention has been paid to how executive compensation 
structures adjust to major public policy induced changes in firms operating environments. 
This paper examines CEO equity-based compensation in the banking industry using 1992-2000 
data.  This time period captures perhaps the most significant deregulation that has ever occurred in the 
banking industry (Calomiris, 2000).  Additionally, the use of equity-based compensation (i.e., stock 
options and restricted shares) to motivate executives has recently come under increased public and 
congressional scrutiny.  The resulting concerns have led to demands for greater transparency in executive 
stock option programs and, possibly, to elimination of the programs altogether because they are claimed 
to be a poor way to measure an executive’s contribution to firm performance.  Over the nine-year period 
that we examine a number of regulatory changes have afforded banking organizations a greater degree of 
managerial discretion and incentive to use equity-based compensation. Deregulation increases the CEO’s 
investment opportunity set and could make it difficult for shareholders to evaluate the executive’s actions, 
thus exaggerating the information asymmetry problems between executives and shareholders. In such an 
atmosphere of greater degree of managerial discretion, there is no assurance that the self-interested 
behavior of CEOs will conform to that expected by shareholders (Prendergast, 2000).  In addition, 
beginning in 1987, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System began to permit banking 
organizations to form separately capitalized security subsidiaries to underwrite corporate debt and equity 
securities under the Section 20 provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act.  This deregulation expands the 
investment opportunities for banking organizations. In this paper, we document a positive correlation 
between the nontraditional noninterest sources of revenue, including revenue from Section 20 activity, 
and the use of equity-based compensation. This positive association is consistent with Smith and Watts 
(1992) conjecture that greater investment opportunities are correlated with relatively more equity-based 
compensation to align the interest of CEOs and shareholders.  We also document a higher percentage of 
equity-based compensation in the period after the passage of the Reigle-Neal Interstate Banking and 19 
Branching Efficiency Act of 1994.  Thus, banking organizations appear to respond to geographical 
deregulation by providing relatively more equity-based incentives to better align CEOs’ incentives with 
those of shareholders.  This is consistent with the theoretical argument of Prendergast (2002) and the 
empirical findings of Kole and Lehn (1999).  20 
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The distribution of noninterest revenue by year 
 
Traditional noninterest revenue is income from fiduciary activities plus service charges on deposit 
accounts. Nontraditional noninterest revenue is all other noninterest revenue. 
 

















































Table 1  
Bank holding companies with Section 20 subsidiaries 
Initial    Average total  
Order   assets (billion of dollars) 
Bankers Trust New York Corporation    4/87    108 
Citicorp            4/87    254 
J.P. Morgan & Company        4/87    198 
Chase Manhattan Corporation      5/87     438 
Chemical New York Corporation      5/87     161 
PNC Financial Corporation        7/87      71 
First Interstate Bancorp        10/87      53 
Bank of Boston Corporation        8/88      53 
First Chicago Corporation        8/88      56 
Fleet/Norstar Financial Group      10/88      97 
Huntington Bancshares Incorporated     11/88      24 
Barnett Banks, Inc.          1/89      40 
NationsBank Corporation        5/89    159 
Southtrust Corporation        7/89      62 
First Union Corporation        7/89    149 
Norwest            12/89    121 
Banc One Corporation        7/90    149 
Dauphin Deposit Corporation       6/91        5 
Synovus Financial Corporation      9/91      10 
BankAmerica Corporation        3/92    229 
National City Corporation         2/94      70 
SunTrust Banks Inc.          8/94      62 
First of America Bank Corporation      10/94      23 
Mellon Financial Corporation       4/95      47 
Bank of New York Co Inc.        6/96      69 
KeyCorp             2/96       81 
Corestates Financial Corporation      8/97       33 
BB&T Corporation          9/97      46 
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Table 2 Deregulation and CEO compensation 
 
This table reports means for various components of CEO compensation for banking organizations with Section 20 subsidiaries.  All data are from ExecuComp.  
The p-value reports the significance of the difference between the two sample means.  All dollar values are in thousands; and converted to 1982-84 dollars using 
the Consumer Price Index for All urban Consumer (CPI-U).  Total cash compensation is the sum of salary and bonus.  Total equity-based compensation is the 
sum of the value of stock options granted and stock shares granted.  Total compensation is the sum of total cash compensation and total-equity based 
compensation.  The percentage of equity-based compensation (EBC) is total equity-based compensation divided by total compensation. 
 
1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 
Cash Compensation 
  Section 20   1,221.63  1,655.34  1,363.28  1,379.91  1,685.10  2,025.98  1,729.28  1,919.58  2,005.21   
  Others    580.33     610.54     595.70     665.97     637.69     675.90     696.69     707.92     696.08 
  P-value  0.0000  0.0010  0.0000  0.0008  0.0011  0.0003  0.0014  0.0019  0.0297 
 
Equity-based Compensation 
  Section 20     993.56  1,120.08  1,860.83     809.42  1,715.90  2,546.85  2,326.85  4,187.67  6,046.35   
  Others    395.58     309.13     434.42     412.95     668.52     732.50  1,273.59  1,395.12  1,160.96 
  P-value  0.0148  0.0259  0.0016  0.0097  0.0077  0.0117  0.0322  0.0149  0.0384 
 
Total Compensation 
  Section 20   2,215.19  2,775.41  3,224.12  2,189.34  3,401.99  4,572.75  4,055.50  6,107.25  8,051.56   
  Others    975.91     919.67  1,030.11  1,078.92  1,306.21  1,408.48   1,970.28  2,103.04  1,857.04 
  P-value  0.0013  0.0011  0.0002  0.0004  0.0003  0.0004  0.0029  0.0049  0.0177 
 
Compensation per thousand dollars of total assets 
Cash  
  Section 20   0.0372  0.0434  0.0397  0.0353  0.0358  0.0401  0.0381  0.0389  0.0383   
  Others  0.0904  0.0966  0.0924  0.1058  0.1094  0.1090  0.0962  0.0919  0.0848 
  P-value  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0002  0.0062 
 
Equity-based 
  Section 20   0.0224  0.0222  0.0375  0.0211  0.0361  0.0517  0.0547  0.0859  0.0982   
  Others  0.0374  0.0437  0.0528  0.0641  0.1019  0.1100  0.1727  0.1449  0.1153 
  P-value  0.0373  0.0301  0.1928  0.0053  0.0434  0.0443  0.0453  0.1987  0.6934 27 
Table 3 Deregulation and CEO compensation, continuation 
 
1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 
Total 
  Section 20   0.0596  0.0655  0.0772  0.0564  0.0729  0.0918  0.0929  0.1248  0.1366   
  Others  0.1284  0.1403  0.1452  0.1699  0.2113  0.2190  0.2689  0.2368  0.2002 
  P-value  0.0000  0.0000  0.0002  0.0000  0.0003  0.0004  0.0063  0.0484  0.0305 
 
% EBC 
  Section 20   38.70  34.26  49.79  35.61  48.58  46.58  51.30  66.02  68.32   
  Others  27.18  25.07  30.81  29.63  34.08  39.44  46.65  51.72  47.13 
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Table 4  
Correlates between CEO’s equity-based compensation and firm financial characteristics 
 
This table reports the regression results of correlating EBC and banking organization’s financial characteristics using the following equation: 
 
+ + + + + + = - - - - - 1 , 5 1 , 4 1 , 3 1 , 2 1 , 1 0 , t j t j t j t j t j t j NT NONTRADNOI SIZE RISK LEVERAGE E PERFORMANC EBC a a a a a a  
      t j t t j t j DEREG SECT TRADNOINT , 8 1 , 7 1 , 6 20 e a a a + + + - -  
The dependent variable is the percentage of EBC for CEOs. The percentage of equity-based compensation (EBC) is total equity-based compensation 
divided by total compensation.  PERFORMANCE j,t-1 is captured by two variables: the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity and net income 
divided by total assets. LEVERAGEj,t-1 is captured by two variables: one minus the book value of equity divided by the book value of total assets and total 
deposits divided by total assets. RISKj,t-1 is the variance of daily stock return within a year; SIZEj,t-1 is the natural logarithm of total assets divided by 1000; 
TRADNOINTj,t-1 is noninterest revenue from fiduciary activities plus service charges on deposit accounts divided by operating income; NONTRADNOINTj,t-1 is 
noninterest revenue are all other noninterest revenue (e.g., municipal revenue bond underwriting, commercial paper underwriting, discount brokerage, managing 
and advising open- and close-end mutual funds, underwriting mortgage-backed securities, selling and underwriting various forms of insurance products, selling 
annuities, and other investment banking activities via Section 20 subsidiaries); DEREGt is a Reigle-Neal binary variable that is equal to one after 1996, zero 
otherwise; SECT20j,t-1 is a Section 20 binary variable that is equal to one for the banking organizations with Section 20 subsidiaries, zero otherwise, and e j,t is an 
error term.  Number of firm-year observations is 621. Numbers in parentheses below the coefficient estimates are t-statistics. The t-statistics are starred if the 
regression coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 10 (*), 5(**), and 1 (***) percent level. 
 
(1)  (2)    (3)  (4)      (5) 
Performance measures 
Market-to-Book       2.3762    2.9832    2.8635 
        (1.99)
**    (2.45)
**    (2.42)
** 
 
Net income-to-Total Assets                1.3374       1.9380 
                    (0.53)      (0.85) 
Leverage measures 
Deposit-to-Total Assets            0.1594           0.1613 
       
        (1.56)
          (1.57) 
 
(One minus Book capital     -0.1793     -0.7243       -0.6228     
    divided by total assets)    (-0.29)    (-1.16)   
    (-0.89)
     
 
Risk         8.4486    10.7405    9.3544    11.8320     11.0970 
        (2.48)
**    (3.16)
***   (2.82)
***   (3.04)
***       (2.83)
*** 
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Table 4  
Correlates between CEO’s equity-based compensation and firm financial characteristics, Cont’d 
 
   
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)      (5) 
 
Size             4.6517    5.0556    4.4289      4.9082 
       
    (4.52)
***   (4.65)
***   (4.30)
***     (4.50)
*** 
Nontraditional noninterest  
    revenue divided by     0.6676    0.4211    0.4803    0.4909      0.5412 
     total revenue      (4.39)
***   (2.64)
***   (2.94)
***   (3.08)




    revenue divided by    -0.1057    -0.1454    -0.1531    -0.0905       -0.0487 
    total revenue      (-0.84)    (-1.17)    (-1.24)    (-0.35)      (-0.35) 
 
Section 20 binary      6.7199    0.3249    0.4235     0.2824       0.3546 
        (2.98)
***   (0.12)    (0.16)
    (0.11)      (0.13) 
 
Reigle-Neal binary    12.3341   10.6480   11.6905   13.6155     14.4135 
        (5.51)
***   (4.77)
***   (5.23)
***   (7.27)
***      (7.64)
*** 
 
Asset growth            0.9665     2.0715    2.0406     4.1213      3.9324 
        (0.22)
    (0.48)    (0.48)
    (0.97)      (0.93) 
 
Adjusted R-square    0.1837    0.2092    0.2106    0.2017      0.2039 
       
 